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Abstract
Although still neglected in legal writings, the 2014 agreement on illicit drugs 
between the FARC and the Colombian Government deserves attention for a number 
of reasons, including that it was conceived as an essential part of the broader strategy 
for peace in Colombia, as well as because of its aim of eradicating illicit crops. 
Starting with some remarks on the Colombian ‘drug war’ and the policy and legal 
arguments for classifying the Colombian armed conflict as a non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC), the paper will then proceed with an analysis of the main 
reasons behind the drafting of a partial agreement on illicit drugs between the 
FARC and Colombia in 2014. Next, the paper will address the relevant sections and 
enforcement mechanisms for putting the provisions of the agreement into effect. An 
assessment of how the 2014 agreement has addressed the issue of drug trafficking 
and the issues concerning drug related crimes will also be considered. The paper 
will conclude with the lessons to be drawn from the new Agreement on illicit drugs.
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Resumen
Aunque todavía es un tema descuidado por la doctrina, el Acuerdo de 2014 
sobre las drogas ilícitas entre el Gobierno de Colombia y las FARC, merece 
atención por muchas razones, incluyendo el que fue concebido como una parte 
esencial de una estrategia más amplia para la paz en Colombia, así como por 
su objetivo de erradicar los cultivos ilícitos. Se parte de algunas observaciones 
sobre la “guerra contra las drogas ‘de Colombia y la política y los argumentos 
jurídicos para clasificar el conflicto armado en Colombia como un conflicto 
armado no internacional. Seguidamente se hace un análisis de las principales 
razones que hay detrás de la elaboración de un acuerdo parcial sobre las drogas 
ilícitas entre las FARC y Colombia en 2014. A continuación, este trabajo se 
dirige a los mecanismos de aplicación para poner que sus disposiciones entren 
en vigor. Se hace, igualmente, una evaluación de la forma en que el Acuerdo 
de 2014 ha abordado la cuestión del tráfico de drogas y también se examinan 
las cuestiones relativas a los delitos relacionados con las drogas. El trabajo 
concluye con las lecciones que caben extraer del nuevo Acuerdo sobre las 
drogas ilícitas.
Palabras-clave: drogas ilícitas, FARC y Colombia, los conflictos armados 
sin carácter internacional, proceso de paz, derechos humanos, guerra contra las 
drogas, el tráfico de drogas, America Latina.
‘There is no question today that peace and drugs are closely intertwined and 
that the solution of one problem hinges on the other’. 
Francisco E. Thoumi
1. Introduction
The recent adoption of the partial agreement on illicit drugs reached at 
the meetings being held in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia, the FARC, and the Colombian Government marked a step by the 
Contracting Parties towards the complete elimination of both coca and drug 
trafficking in Colombian territory. The illegal drug economy in Colombia has 
grown significantly over the last few decades, to the point of producing, inter 
alia, a fearsome concentration of land ownership by drug traffickers in what is 
referred to as Colombia’s ‘counter-land reform’, as a result of the accumulation 
of illegal funds2. Existing domestic laws in Colombia, such as Law no. 30 
of 1986 known as the ‘National Narcotics Statute’ (Estatuto Nacional de 
2  See e.g. Bojan Dobovšek, ‘Understanding the Colombian Civil War’, (2010) Review of 
International Affairs, pp. 23-47.
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Estupefacientes – ENE), purely a tool of control and repression without any 
preventive and rehabilitative purposes, and Decree no. 1188 of 1974 which 
increased the sanctions for trafficking and criminalized use, have appeared 
unequal to the task of eradicating this vicious commerce3.Awakened to the 
necessity for concerted and more effective action to rein in the drug cartels, 
the Colombian Government and the FARC rebels began work in 2010 on an 
international agreement that would establish a set of guidelines to be applied by 
the two parties in suppressing illicit trafficking and achieving the enforcement 
of illegal crop substitution projects.
Adopted as part of a wider strategy for peace and at the fiftieth anniversary 
of the start of FARC’s war against the Colombian Government in May 2014, the 
provisional agreement on illicit drugs between FARC rebels and the Colombian 
Government is aimed at establishing a new legal framework for the complete 
eradication of both drug trafficking and coca crops4. Explicitly recognizing that 
illicit trafficking is ‘an international criminal activity’, the Agreement introduces 
a different treatment for the growers of natural raw components for drugs from 
that of the criminal economic entities involved in the different steps of the illicit 
drug trade. It thus marks a path that begins with participation processes for 
local collectivities to make a commitment to the state to substitute illicit crops 
and refrain from participating in the trade of raw components derived from 
such crops. All producing collectivities –regardless of whether they approve or 
disapprove of crop replacement– will have their illicit crops eliminated, with 
the elimination being achieved either by the collectivities themselves or by 
public bodies established for this purpose. In addition to this, the Agreement 
also commits the Colombian Government to enacting measures so that global-
capitalistic countries, in particular the United States and the EU countries, 
will convert to policies to cut off demand, address use from the perspective 
of public health, and concentrate on fundamental rights. This is implicit in the 
idea, explicitly indicated in the Joint Communiqué issued on 16 May 2014, 
that: ‘There won’t be any solution to the problem of illicit drugs without the 
express commitment of the U.S. Government with a definitive change in their 
failed policy called war on drugs’.
Unlike the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, which is one of the most far-reaching tools ever adopted 
in the sector of international criminal law, the 2014 Agreement between the FARC 
3  Amplius Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes and Diana Esther Guzmán, ‘Drug policy and the prison 
situation in Colombia’, available at: http://druglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Systems_
Overload/Colombia-en.pdf; T. Chantal, ‘Disciplining Globalization: International Law, Illegal Trade, 
and the Case of Narcotics’ (2003) Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 1089, available at: http://
scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1089
4  See Gillian Higgins, ‘Peace Agreement Reached Between Colombian Government and FARC’, 
available at: (also recalling that: ‘While it is not in the text of the accord, President Juan Manuel 
Santos said that the sides have agreed to sign a final accord within the next six months’). 
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and Colombia neglects to approach the issue of drug trafficking in a efficient and 
operative way. Indeed, the language of this Agreement is rather unclear and opaque, 
as it fails to clarify the meaning and scope of such core expressions and notions as ‘the 
problem of illicit drugs’, ‘the fight against organised crime’, ‘the strategy to combat 
asset laundering’, and ‘state control over the trade in inputs and precursor chemicals’. 
For these and other reasons, such as the wording that ‘If we understand drug cartels 
as mafias that manage international trafficking routes, then the FARC is not the big 
cartel that the authorities make them out to be’5, the Agreement can only be seen as a 
contribution of little significance in the battle against illicit substances. 
After some remarks on the Colombian drug war, on the policy and legal 
arguments for classifying the Colombian armed conflict as a non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC), and on the reasons leading up to the drafting of an 
international agreement on illicit drugs between the FARC and Colombia in 
2014, this paper briefly reviews the most important terms of this provisional 
agreement, from an international legal perspective. As one of the biggest 
producers of psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs on the globe, Colombia 
has achieved broad experience in developing law enforcement instruments 
against drug cartels and drug traffickers, including FARC rebels. But this 
experience does not arise from the final text of the Agreement. However, most 
of the provisions of the 2014 Agreement reflect regulatory approaches and 
devices already present both in the international drug control system and in the 
repressive drug policies of the last decades of the twentieth century in Latin 
America (though not in the most recent OAS Position on Drugs)6. For this and 
other reasons, the Agreement between the FARC and Colombia, which is based 
on prohibition, does not consider the significant amount of progress achieved 
in processes, which currently constitutes a critical mass towards a regulation 
set-up, to use Ricardo Vargas’s own words7. These processes (again to use 
Ricardo Vargas’s own words) include the drafting of new operative core terms 
paralleling elimination of drug crops, prohibition and enforcement, as well as 
the drafting of harm reduction schemes based on the idea that psychotropic 
substances and narcotic drugs must be accepted as a reality to be lived with, 
while avoiding or reducing the harm that psychotropic substances and drugs 
can cause to users and public health8.
5  ‘Las FARC y las drogas’, El Tiempo, 27 February 2014, http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/
gustavoduncan/las-farc-y-las-drogas-gustavo-duncan-columnista-el-tiempo-_13569875-4 (last accessed 21 
October 2015), as quoted by John Otis, ‘The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade’, available at: https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf (last accessed 4 November 2015).
6  On this topic, see M. Speck, ‘The OAS Position on Drugs: A (Gradual) New Approach’, available at: 
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2013/06/21/the-oas-position-on-drugs-a-gradual-new-approach/
7  See Ricardo M. Vargas, ‘Drugs, armed conflict and peace. How does the agreement on drugs 
between the government and the FARC help to put an end to the armed conflict in Colombia?’, (2014) 
42 Drug Policy Briefing, available at: https://www.tni.org/files/download/dpb_42_eng_072014.pdf
8  See Ricardo M. Vargas, op. ult. cit.
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2. Background Information on the Colombian ‘Drug War’
Since 1964, Colombia has experienced a low-intensity asymmetric war 
in which the Colombian Government has fought against several ‘bandas 
criminales’ (criminal gangs) also known as BACRIM groups, left-wing 
guerrillas, well-organized paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia, Latin America’s oldest and largest guerrilla army 
known as the FARC, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which are 
closely linked with drug trafficking9. Since the beginning of this conflict, the 
United States has militarily assisted the Colombian Government in the battle 
against those guerrilla movements and against drug traffickers themselves10. 
One example of this assistance is the plan of cooperation between the United 
States and Colombia, called Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the 
Strengthening of the State (usually referred to as ‘Plan Colombia’), launched in 
1999. As has already been observed by others, ‘Plan Colombia’ represented a 
new approach to cooperation against drug trafficking11.
This is evident if one considers that, since that time, the United States 
has treated the fight against drug traffickers in Colombia and elsewhere as 
essentially a police issue, supplying equipment and other aid to the police for 
counternarcotics efforts. However, since the early 2000s, the United States’ 
approach has been to provide this assistance directly to the Colombian 
Government. Even more significantly, in addition to being militarized (the US 
shift to supporting the armed forces rather than the police), the fight against 
drug traffickers has also begun to privatize. The US Departments of State and 
Defense have contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) in 
particular to offer logistics support for reconnaissance airplanes and maintain 
an up-to-date intelligence database.
Of special relevance to our investigation is the FARC’s participation in 
Colombia’s illegal drug trade. In this regard, it is worth stressing that the FARC 
has long defended its practice of boosting coca cultivation and then taxing drug 
9  See e.g. Bruce M. Bagley, ‘Colombia and the War on Drugs’, available at: https://www.
foreignaffairs.org/articles/bolivia/1988-09-01/colombia-and-war-drugs (last accessed 4 November 
2015); C. Voelkel, ‘Five Common Misunderstandings of War and Peace in Colombia, Crisis Group’, 
available at: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2012/10/08/five-common-misunderstandings-
of-war-and-peace-in-colombia/ (last accessed 5 November 2015). 
10  See e.g. P. Burbidge, ‘Justice and Peace ? – The Role of Law in Resolving Colombia’s Civil 
Conflict’, (2008) 3 International Criminal Law Review, p. 559 ff.
11  Amplius L. W. Rosen, ‘International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses’, 
available at: (also stressing that ‘Plan Colombia’ was intended to be a six-year plan, concluding in 2005, 
to end the country’s decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic 
and social development. The plan aimed to curb trafficking activity and reduce coca cultivation in 
Colombia by 50% over six years. In support of Plan Colombia and its follow-up programs, the US 
government spent more than $8 billion in security and development assistance between FY2000 and 
FY2011, including both civilian and military counterdrug support efforts).
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producers for defending their crops on the grounds that peasants in remote zones 
have no real alternatives for living their existence. Control over coca cultivation 
in Colombia aided the FARC in expanding its social base. Moreover, it has also 
led the Colombian Defence Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzón, to note that the FARC 
was involved in drug trafficking ‘at every level’. Nevertheless, the FARC is 
not yet involved in the most lucrative downstream features of the drug trade: 
retail distribution in consumer countries. In other words, within the illegal drug 
industry’s division of labour, the FARC’s strength lies in retaining control over 
coca growers in southern Colombia, and in the defence its affiliates can offer to 
drug traffickers through its status as the last remaining illegal armed entity with 
a national standing in Colombia.
3. Policy and Legal Arguments for Classifying the Colombian Drug 
War as a NIAC
Our starting point here is that the Colombian conflict can be characterized 
as an armed conflict due to the presence of numerous guerrilla movements and 
paramilitary groups with responsible command controlling some portions of 
Colombian territory, and to the intensity of violence against civilians and the 
Colombian state. In particular, the intensity of violence justifies this statement. 
This is because some important triggers considered in the classification of an 
armed conflict are its intensity, duration and scope12.
Looking at the Colombian situation, the so called Colombian drug war, 
through the international humanitarian law (IHL)’s most classical distinction of 
armed conflicts into ‘international armed conflict (IAC)’ and ‘non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC)’, it is not difficult to conclude that the situation in 
Colombia resembles a NIAC13. More precisely, this situation resembles a 
specific type of NIAC, that is ‘internal armed conflict, including one or more 
foreign interventions’14. This conclusion –which is important because whether 
12  See e.g. Alex G. Peterson, Order out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, 171 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2002), pp. 9-10; Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in 
International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED 
CROSS 69, 70 (2009), http://icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf.
13  On this distinction, see e.g. Carina Bergal, ‘The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-
International Armed Conflict Classification’, (2011) 34 Fordham Int’l L.J., p. 1047 ff (also recalling 
that: ‘Although NIAC was not regulated prior to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Article 3 
served as the basis from which to resolve the meaning of NIAC under IHL.’.)
14  Incidentally, it is worth recalling that though the possibility of internationalizing a conflict is 
widely accepted in international jurisprudence, the same jurisprudence remains divided on the issue 
of what degree of control by one state over the parties acting internally in another state is required to 
internationalize a NIAC. See e.g. A. Perret, above no. 15 (stressing that prior to Tadić, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) did not attribute the acts of the contras – the various rebel groups opposing 
Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front – to the United States, because the control the state 
exercised over them was not comparable to the control that the United States would exercise over its 
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or not an armed conflict is international or non-international is fundamental for 
establishing the extent to which international humanitarian law (IHL) applies 
to a situation15– is suggested by the fact that the privatization of cooperation 
between the United States and Colombia, the so-called ‘Plan Colombia’, 
which allowed the United States Government to fight against drug cartels 
in Colombia, worked as a source of internationalization of the Colombian 
conflict16. This has been particularly evident since the early 2000s, when the 
US Departments of State and Defense hired a wide number of private military 
and security companies (PMSCs) to lead activities to aid the Colombian police 
and army17. Moreover, that the Colombian conflict is to be classified as a de 
jure armed conflict to which international humanitarian law (IHL) applies 
is indirectly confirmed by the scope of the conflict between the Colombian 
authorities and domestic drug traffickers, which has obliged the Colombian 
Government to respond not only with law enforcement but also with military 
forces in an escalating conflict.18 In fact, the nature of both the Colombian war 
and the corresponding military response has transformed this conflict from a 
simple criminal activity to an armed conflict (that is a NIAC), subject to the 
law governing armed conflicts, and the accompanying human rights provisions 
in particular. This is despite the fact that, according to a traditional communis 
opinio, the laws of armed conflicts were not applicable to a NIAC unless an 
established state recognized the belligerency of the non-state entity.19 But 
this approach radically changed over time, since the international community 
own state actors. As a result, the ICJ held that the Nicaraguan armed conflict was not internationalized 
and instead remained a NIAC).
15  In most circumstances, the only IHL applicable in a NIAC is Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, whereas all of IHL applies in a NIAC. 
16  See Phil Williams, ‘Transnational criminal organisations and international security’, (1994) 36 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, pp. 96-113. 
17  PMSCs can be defined as: ‘[C]orporations offering security, defence and/or military services 
to states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies and/
or armed groups. These services include armed guarding and protection of persons and objects or 
buildings, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention and interrogation, 
intelligence, risk assessment and military research analysis, as well as advice to or training of 
local forces and security personnel’. See Francesco Francioni, Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Introduction’, in 
Francesco Francioni, Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, 
and Private Contractors, Oxford: OUP, 2011, p. 1.
18  Amplius T. Dunninga, L. Wirpsa, ‘Oil and the political economy of conflict in Colombia and 
beyond: a linkages approach’ (2004) 9 (1) Geopolitics, pp. 81-108; Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, 
Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional 
Stability, RAND: Pittsburgh, 2001, pp. 1-6. 
19  Further discussion and references on this issue can be found in S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict, Oxford: OUP, 2012, PP. 155-212; Marco Sassòli, The Role of Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts, in Orna Ben-Naftali 
(ed.), International humanitarian law and international human rights law, Oxford: OUP, 2011, p. 19 
ff; M. Happold, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in Christian Henderson 
and Nigel White (eds.), Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law, Edward 
Elgar, 2012, also available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2065974
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accepted that: ‘[w]hat is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international 
wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife’.20 In other words, 
the laws of armed forces evolved and enacted a more humanistic attitude, and 
international humanitarian law is currently the main law utilized when referring 
to armed conflicts21.
However, a very different conclusion, namely the classification of the 
Colombian conflict as a pure NIAC, could be inferred from the fact that 
PMSCs contracted by the United States supplied services such as fumigation 
of illegal coca cultivation and intelligence without direct and strict control by 
the United States Government22. However, there are numerous cases of a US 
PMSC’s de facto participation in the Colombian internal conflict23. This is 
despite the fact that in purely legal terms, US PMSCs are not to be involved 
in hostilities, since the US Congress has forbidden all activities involving 
close and direct participation in the Colombian conflict24. In this regard, it is 
sufficient to recall, as exemplary of this de facto participation, the activities 
of DynCorp. The US State Department contracted DynCorp to fumigate the 
illegal cultivation of coca plants in southern and central Colombia. Although 
fumigation comprised the main content of the contract between DynCorp and 
the US State Department, the presence of DynCorp contractors in the combat 
helicopters that generally accompanied the planes that dropped the glyphosate, 
and their participation in repelling attacks, was significant25. This is confirmed 
by statistics: between 2001 and 2002 (just one year after the start of DynCorp’s 
fumigation contract), nearly 10 aircraft attacks per month occurred, increasing 
in 2003 to reach a peak of 70 attacks per month26. The use of force inherent in 
these helicopter missions led to the conclusion that these PMSCs were involved 
20  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-91-1-AR72I, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, p. 119 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995).
21  See e.g. A. G. Peterson, above n. 8, p. 13.
22  See M. Boysen, Private Military Firms as Instruments of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Columbia, Master’s Thesis, 2007, ch. I and II. 
23  Amplius R. Majewski, ‘Cocaine Blues: The Cost of Democratization under Plan Colombia’, in 
M. Forte (ed.), Force Multipliers: The Instrumentalities of Imperialism, Alter Press, 2015, p. 125 ff.
24  See e.g. A. Perret, The role of the inter-American system of human rights in the regulation of 
private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Latin America, EUI PhD theses, 2014, available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/33870 (last accessed 4 November 2015); R. Majewski, above n. 21, p. 125 ff. 
25  See F. Mathieu, N. Dearden, ‘Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military & Security 
Companies’ (2007) 34 (114) Review of African Political Economy, pp. 744-755; A. Leander, ‘The 
Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies’, 
(2005) 33 Journal of International Studies, pp. 803-825; K McCallion, ‘War for Sale! Battlefield 
Contractors in Latin America & the ‘Corporatization’ of America’s War on Drugs’ (2005) 36 (2/3) The 
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, pp. 317-353. 
26  Amplius K. Penhaul, ‘Americans Blamed in Colombia Raid’, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 15 June 
2001, available at: http://sfgate.com/news/article/Americans-blamed-in-Colombia-raid-2910509.php, as 
quoted by A Perret, ‘Privatization of the War on Drugs in Mexico and Colombia. Limiting the Application 
of Humanitarian Law and Endangering Human Rights’, (2012-2013) Interdisciplinary Journal of Human 
Rights Law, p. 55, note 45.
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in the Colombian conflict. Nevertheless, though it is clear in the Colombian 
context that PMSCs have taken part in the hostilities, it is harder to demonstrate 
the second requirement: that the PMSCs were acting as agents of their home 
country’s government. Although this is difficult, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts offers some guidance in ascertaining the relationship between a 
PMSC and its home country27.
4. Why an Agreement on Illicit Drugs Between the FARC and Colombia?
One might be tempted to answer this question by asking why Colombia, 
unlike the vast majority of the states of the world, is not part of the 
International drug control system. In particular, unlike Peru and Bolivia, 
Colombia has only signed, but has not ratified, the 1988 U.N. Convention 
on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Psychotropic Substances (C.I.D.T.)28.While 
there are obvious reasons for this at first, others are less obvious and are to be 
reported. Of course, there is the obvious difficulty for a top drug trafficking 
country like Colombia to adhere to the prohibition-oriented UN drug control 
system29. This is evident if one considers that Colombia is the major illicit 
producer and supplier of cocaine and marijuana to the United States and other 
drug markets. Again, this is also clear if one considers that, unlike Bolivia 
and Peru, which grow the world’s supply of the coca leaf crop, Colombia 
synthesizes the natural coca leaf into cocaine and provides transport services. 
27  According to the ILC, there are certain circumstances in which the wrongful act of a foreign 
organ, such as a PMSC, can be attributed to its home state. These circumstances arise when the 
foreign organ continues to act as part of, and under the auspices of, the home state, and when there is 
no real functional link established with the beneficiary state. In the context of the Colombian conflict, 
wrongful conduct by US PMSCs may be attributable to the United States government if the PMSCs 
are acting in the service of the United States government, rather than the Colombian government. On 
this issue, see e.g. A Perret, above n. 22, p. 54 ff.
28  Adopted by consensus at an international conference of 106 states in Vienna in December 
1988, the Illicit Trafficking Convention is intended to establish a new international legal regime for 
combating international drug trafficking. Explicitly recognizing in the preamble that illicit trafficking 
is ‘an international criminal activity’, it requires that each signatory state establish as criminal offenses 
under its domestic law a comprehensive list of activities involved in or related to international drug 
trafficking. For commentary, see e.g. J. Gurule, ‘The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances - A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation 
Merely Illusory?’ (1988) 2 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 74 ff; D. HEILMANN, ‘The 
international control of illegal drugs and the U.N. treaty regime: Preventing or causing human rights 
violations?’, available at: http:// works.bepress.com/daniel_heilmann/1 (last accessed 6 November 
2015). 
29  See A. Castro Escudero, ‘El narcotráfico en Colombia’, available at: http://www.gestiopolis.
com/el-narcotrafico-en-colombia (last accessed 14 October 2015) (stressing that Colombia has acted 
more aggressively than most of the signatories of the 1988 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, by including chemicals and drug precursors that are 
freely traded in the rest of the world on the list of nationally controlled substances).
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More precisely, the cocaine base that is produced in Peru and Bolivia is 
exported through Colombia to the global drug markets.
But, having stated this, it would be wrong to affirm that the perplexities 
associated with the various criticisms of the United Nations and the drug 
control bodies for keeping the international drug system unchanged in face of 
fundamental rights breaches by the Contracting States in the so-called ‘wars 
on drugs’ had no influence on the drafting of the 2014 Agreement. In this 
regard, one may take as an example the Latin American Commission on Drugs 
and Democracy statement, according to which: ‘the search for more efficient 
policies, rooted in the respect for human rights, implies taking into account the 
diversity of national situations and emphasizing prevention and treatment’30.
Moreover, one may recall that the adoption of UN drug treaties into internal law 
also brought some concerns in the eyes of the drafters of the 2014 Agreement, 
since some of society’s most vulnerable collectivities were seriously affected by 
it, such as, for instance, drug addicts (who are vulnerable to discrimination) and 
farmers in developing countries (who grow illicit crops and generally have no 
economically sound alternative)31. Yet all this is far from surprising (at least if 
one considers that the prohibition approach of the UN drug control conventions 
has often led to the occurrence of serious and documented breaches of human 
rights in various countries). Self-evidently, this is mainly because the states that 
restrictively interpret their duties under the UN drug treaties tend to enforce 
laws that are beyond the treaty’s requirements. However, having stated this, 
it must be kept in mind that the impact of the UN drug treaties on the internal 
policies on illicit drugs as a result of their implementation in the internal legal 
orders of the Contracting States was only one factor –although a considerable 
one– out of many. Things were further complicated, inter alia, by the fact that 
the international drug control framework currently faces a twofold problem: 
while on the one hand some countries operate, to the extent that human rights are 
breached, with repressive drug supervisory legislation and enforcement, other 
countries follow liberal drug policies that have the potential to run counter to 
the purposes of UN drug control. In other words, summing up, the international 
drug control system, being a prohibition framework focused on controlling the 
production of narcotic drugs and psychoactive substances considered harmful 
to public health, has over time developed side effects that were not taken into 
account (at least in their magnitude) when it was created, but must now be 
taken into consideration by the drafters of any drug treaty or statute. 
30  Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift. Statement by the Latin. American Commission 
on Drugs and Democracy, available at: http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_
ingles_site.pdf (last accessed 9 Nobember 2015). 
31  See e.g. D. Heilmann, ‘International Control of Illegal Drugs and the U.N. Treaty Regime: 
Preventing or Causing Human Rights Violations’, (2011) 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L., p. 237 ff.
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But can all this on its own explains the existence of the 2014 Agreement 
between Colombia and the FARC on illicit drugs? The answer is no, for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it would otherwise be hard, if not impossible, to 
explain why the 2014 Agreement’s main concerns are replacement of illegal 
crops, the subsequent elaboration of development programmes with the 
involvement of local collectivities, and the enforcement of drug consumption 
prevention actions, instead of the supervision of the trafficking of illegal 
narcotic substances from Colombia to the global drug markets (like the 
C.I.D.T.)32. Second, it would be hard to understand why the suspension of 
aerial chemical spraying and reparations for its victims, the restructuring 
of the national health system and the extradition of narcotics traffickers are 
among the issues which remain to be resolved despite their importance in 
practise. Thirdly and lastly, it would be hard to understand why the above-
named Agreement will likely have a minimal impact on the drug trade, since 
it fails to address the root causes of the illegal drug economy in Colombia.
It is this author’s opinion that at least one more reason could also be 
advanced to explain the existence of the 2014 Agreement between Colombia 
and the FARC: the relationship between drugs and peace in Colombia33. This 
relationship is implicitly acknowledged by the inclusion of the subject of 
drugs on the agenda for the peace talks being held in Havana between FARC 
guerrilla leaders and the Colombian government. More precisely, it is implicitly 
acknowledged by the fact that issues of illicit crops, narcotic drug production 
and trafficking are among the major (and less undisputed) challenges for 
a sustainable peace in Colombia. Again, even before that, the relationship 
between peace and illicit drugs in Colombia is suggested by the circumstance 
that the Colombian Government and the FARC have been engaged in peace 
negotiations since 2012 and have thus far reached agreements on land reform, 
political participation, and illegal drugs. Moreover, that the relationship between 
peace and illicit drugs in Colombia can be of some use to explain the existence 
and contents of the 2014 Agreement between Colombia and FARC guerrilla 
leaders is indirectly confirmed by the formal qualification of this Agreement as 
a ‘partial agreement’, namely as a collateral agreement to the future and final 
32  On this issue, see Ricardo M. Vargas, above n. 6 (also stressing that the text of the 2004 
Agreement that places an emphasis on the eradication of illegal coca crops and stipulates that coca 
growing communities must be allowed to participate in the planning and implementation of crop 
substitution programs leaves few doubts about its real aims and priorities).
33  On the peace process in Colombia from an international legal perspective see C. Bernal-Pulido, 
‘Transitional justice within the framework of a permanent constitution: The case study of the legal 
framework for peace in Colombia’, (2014) 3 (4) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, p. 1143; E. Maculan, ‘The Colombian “Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation 
and Non Repetition”: A Holisic and Innovative Proposal’, available at: https://aninternationallawblog.
wordpress.com/2015/12/14/the-colombian-comprehensive-system-of-truth-justice-reparation-and-
non-repetition-a-holistic-and-innovative-proposal/ (last accessed 18 Jauary 2016).
384 Francesco Seatzu
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 18, nº 36. Segundo semestre de 2016. 
Pp. 373-389.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2016.i36.16
peace treaty34. Furthermore, and more significantly, it is indirectly confirmed 
by the circumstance that ‘a political settlement without the drugs issues as a 
key point in the negotiations agenda is inconceivable’35. Lastly, it is indirectly 
confirmed by the classification of the Colombian conflict as a NIAC, a conflict 
arising between a sovereign state and a non-state actor. 
Rebus sic stantibus, it remains to be seen whether the Agreement between 
the Colombian Government and FARC guerrilla leaders on illicit drugs could 
operate as a useful tool for ending the ‘war drug’ in Colombia. 
5. Summary of Provisions
As adopted, the 2014 Agreement calls upon the two Contracting Parties to 
enact specific enforcement measures to increase their ability to address illicit 
coca crops and prosecute those who are involved in drug trafficking across 
the Colombian borders. Such measures include setting up a specialized Truth 
Commission to investigate the global cartels of illicit drug dealers, award 
compensation to victims of aerial spraying with chemical agents, prompt 
suspension of aerial spraying with chemical agents, demilitarize the territories 
and anti-drug policies, identify, persecute and expropriate drug dealers’ assets, 
enact special measures against corruption produced by narco-paramilitarism, 
and recognize the use of psychoactive drugs as a public health issue. 
In addition, the Agreement prescribes recognizing and improving the licit 
uses of coca, poppy and marijuana, and imposes special protections on the 
producers of coca leaves and the users of illicit drugs. It is also demanded that 
the FARC and Colombia adopt effective measures to eradicate illicit cultivation 
of plants containing narcotic or psychotropic components, cooperate in 
eradicating illicitly cultivated crops, and enact measures aimed at ending or 
diminishing illicit demand.
Lastly, as part of the democratic reorganization of the Colombian state, 
and as a response to the obsolescence of the current institutions of anti-drug 
policy that focus on counterinsurgency approaches and are subordinated to 
US anti-drug policy, a new institutional regulation is foreseen to meet the 
purposes and actions included in the set of proposals elaborated by the FARC-
34  See also Kyra Gurney, ‘FARC, Colombia Govt Drug Agreement Doomed to Failure?’, available at: 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/farc-colombia-govt-drug-agreement-doomed-to-failure 
(last accessed 4 November 2015) (stressing that: ‘While the partial agreement reached on illegal 
drugs serves as a promising sign that peace negotiations are moving forward, in the event of a final 
agreement ultimately being signed, the drug trade measures stipulated will likely prove difficult to 
enact’).
35  See M. Jelsma, ‘Conflict, Sustainable Development, and the Illegal Drug Economy in Colombia: 
An Analysis of Trends and Policy Recommendations for a Peace Building Approach’, available at: 
https://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/koffjelsma_0.pdf (last accessed 5 November 2015). 
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EP, regarding the fourth item on the Agenda, ‘Solution to the problem of illicit 
drugs’. The development of the new institutions will be the responsibility of 
the ‘Commission for the design and monitoring of a sovereign, democratic and 
participatory national anti-drug policy’. 
6. Addressing Illicit Crops
Point 2 of the Agreement (also known as the second sub-proposal of the 
Joint Communiqué of 16 May 2014) requires developing and enforcing the 
‘National Program for the substitution of illicit uses of coca, poppy and marijuana 
crops’. The rationale behind this statement is clear and straightforward: the 
idea that the main reasons for the growth of the illicit traffic in coca leaf and 
marijuana are socioeconomic, and lie in the poverty of displaced persons from 
the countryside, planters, and indigenous groups. In more general terms, the 
rationale behind the underlying approach in point 2 is the perception that 
measures to reduce production in the initial phases of the drug chain will lead 
to a diminution in supply. This is consistent with the initially-agreed aim of 
finding ‘a definitive solution to the problem of illicit drugs’. 
To the contrary, less clear, and open to dispute, is why the territorial 
approach that the Agreement enacts is not based on an integrated view of the 
territory, but is reduced to the coca situation. This is particularly the case when 
one considers that point 2 also provides that: ‘The policy for the substitution 
of the illicit uses of crops aims to favor an approach of comprehensive civil, 
political, economic, social, cultural and human rights over policy of interdiction 
or prohibition, persecution, stigmatization and criminalization’, as well as: 
‘... the improvement of the living conditions of workers of coca, poppy and 
marijuana crops’. Moreover, it is far from clear and understandable why the 
possibility of using land seized from drug cartels as a way to give farmers a 
more feasible alternative –for reasons of location, soil quality and access to 
markets– was not even contemplated in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué36.
These ‘core’ or ‘covered’ statements under point 2 are the cornerstone 
of the new Agreement, and are clearly linked to the FARC rebels’ Marxist 
political designs of radically challenging imperialist capitalism in Colombia37. 
Many of the other provisions in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué, for instance 
those relating to the ‘broadest possible amnesty’ for the political crime of 
rebelling against the state and for the so called ‘connected crimes’ (but not for 
36  Amplius Ricardo Vargas, above n. 6. 
37  The FARC is a Marxist group that originated in the 1970s with the aim of taking over the 
government in Colombia by violence. On this issue, see e.g. Ari Chaplin, Chávez’s Legacy: The 
Transformation from Democracy to a Mafia State (University Press of America, 2014), xxx.
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crimes against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes, hostage-taking or other 
serious privation of liberty, torture, forced displacement, forced disappearance, 
extrajudicial executions, or sexual violence)38 and to a good living for peasant 
communities and families, and the provisions on the prevalence of human 
rights with regard to the policies of substitution of illicit uses of crops, and 
on compensation and incentives for producing communities and workers, are 
keyed to these statements. 
Closely linked to point 2, point 6 of the Agreement states that: ‘Contracting 
Parties are required to take necessary steps to demilitarise territories and 
anti-drug policies’. This statement, which is in line with the FARC-EP’s 
transformation into a legal political entity, is complemented by other statements 
concerning the non-intervention, autonomy and self-determination of anti-
drug policies. Moreover, and more significantly, it is complemented by the 
prescription (again in point 6) of a programme to decriminalize producers and 
workers, as well as narcotics consumers. From all this and other evidence, it 
may then be safely concluded that point 6 is a self-enforcing and self-executing 
provision. In fact, unlike the majority of other points in the Agreement/Joint 
Communiqué, point 6 is comprised largely of fully self-executing statements. 
Specially exemplary in this regard is the statement that foresees the end of 
the governmental strategies to bring a state presence to rural and conflicted 
areas, the so called ‘National policy for territorial consolidation’ (PNCRT) and 
‘Territorial consolidation plans’39.
7. Addressing Drug Trafficking
It has been correctly observed that the Agreement/Joint Communiqué 
has addressed the issue of drug trafficking in an extremely generalized 
manner. There is considerable evidence of this, but prominent here is the 
failure to provide for adequate mechanisms for the monitoring, detection, 
retrieval and confiscation of drug-related laundered funds and assets (perhaps 
with the sole notable exception of the ‘Independent Commission of Truth on 
the transnational capitalist enterprise of drug-trafficking’). Other evidence 
concerns the absence of control measures to prevent drug traffickers from 
obtaining secure identity documents or counterfeiting them. Moreover, 
38  On this issue, see in particular A. Kay, ‘Peace Agreement Reached Between Colombian 
Government and FARC’, available at: http://9bri.com/peace-agreement-reached-between-colombian-
government-and-farc/ (last accessed 4 November 2015) (stressing, inter alia, that an amnesty law will 
specify the extent of this ‘connectedness’).
39  On the subject, see e.g. Claudia Sánchez-Bustamante, ‘Territorial Consolidation in Colombia: 
the Right to have Territory and a Territory with Rights’, available at: http://dialogo-americas.com/
en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2014/01/06/consolidacion-territorial (last accessed 21 
October 2015).
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further evidence arises from the lack of appropriate budgetary funds for 
drug supervision and crime prevention in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué. 
Lastly, additional evidence may be found in the language of the Agreement/
Joint Communiqué, which is far too imprecise and vague, as it fails to clarify 
the meaning of such key expressions as ‘the fight against organized crime’, 
‘the strategy to combat asset laundering’, ‘state control over the trade in 
inputs and precursor chemicals’, ‘state control on capital flows, financial 
regulations and special audits’, ‘the special measures and actions against 
corruption produced by narco-paramilitarism’ and, lastly, the reiteration that 
asset forfeiture procedures will be ‘effectively applied’40.
Similar considerations also apply, Mutatis mutandis, to the ‘Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace’ (‘SJP’), which is to be composed by two sections or 
chambers (the Tribunal for Peace and the Chambers of Justice). Although it is 
clear that this jurisdiction will operate as a separate jurisdiction not subject to 
normal rules, it is not clear whether it will be a temporary body in Colombia’s 
justice system. Unfortunately, this issue is not clarified by the Agreement/Joint 
Communiqué and remains an open one, although the temporary character of 
the SJP could be (but with no certainty!) inferred from its institutional mission 
to obtain truth, do away with impunity, contribute to victims’ reparations, and 
to judge, prescribe and lay down sanctions for those allegedly responsible for 
serious crimes taking place during the armed conflict, and the most serious 
and representative ones in particular. Again, this is even though the SJP’s 
temporary nature could be considered as implicitly suggested by the SJP’s 
requirements to receive reduced sentences and ‘special treatment’, provide 
reparations to victims, and guarantee non-repetition of their acts. 
Going on briefly now to recall the way in which the Agreement/Joint 
Communiqué deals with the problem of drug use, we find that its references 
to drug use are far too generic, characterized in particular by a failure to 
differentiate between drug use and abuse (or problem drug utilization), or 
between different substances as a key element in dealing with the issue. This 
is despite the fact that some clarity as to the issue of recreational use and 
abuse of drugs should have been considered as compulsory by the drafters 
of the Agreement/Joint Communiqué. Again, and more specifically, this 
is despite the fact that some clarity around this issue would have been of 
strategic relevance in marking the legal boundaries between drug abuse and 
addiction. 
40  See Gillian Higgins, above n. 3.
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8. Concluding Remarks
There are some hidden lessons to learn from the 2014 Agreement between 
the FARC and Colombian Government on illicit drugs. One of these is that 
the initially-agreed purpose of finding ‘a definitive solution to the ‘problem 
of illicit drugs’ (without even defining it in the Agreement) was naive and 
simplistic. Yet it is a fact of common experience that, with no exceptions, the 
problem of illicit drugs cannot be solved, but only managed. Another lesson is 
that, unlike what was done in the 2014 Agreement, the problem of illicit drugs 
has to be managed by taking human rights into account in drug control efforts, 
rather than by criminalizing and punishing drug traffickers41.
Still, the above-named Agreement also has some merits, which, far from 
being ‘beyond question’, bear some consideration. First, the Agreement is 
significant in that it proposes a multi-pronged strategy for combating drug 
(coca) trafficking in Colombia. Essential to this strategy is the emphasis on the 
eradication of illicit crops. To this end, the Agreement makes a commitment 
to the state to replace illicit crops and refrain from participating in the trade of 
raw materials derived from such crops. All producer communities –regardless 
of whether or not they agree with crop substitution– will have their illicit crops 
eradicated, with the eradication being carried out either by the communities 
themselves or by state agencies set up for the purpose. The eradication may 
even be done by means of aerial spraying. The Agreement further provides 
for an obligation for the Colombian Government to undertake structural 
transformation of coca-growing regions through sustainable crop-substitution 
and alternative development programs. In addition, the Agreement recognizes 
the need to prioritize efforts to prevent and treat drug consumption. More 
precisely, it has pledged to create a high-level program to revise and coordinate 
policies related to drug consumption and to approach the problem as a public 
health issue rather than a criminal justice issue.
Unfortunately, an examination of the last part of the Agreement reveals the 
substantial weakness of the commitments by both the Colombian Government 
and the FARC to end the trafficking of illicit drugs. The Colombian Government 
has agreed to enforce an integral strategy to stop drug-related corruption by 
public organizations, end money laundering and create strict new controls 
against the smuggling of precursor chemicals indispensable for making illegal 
drugs42. The Colombian Government has also agreed to host a conference jointly 
organized by the United Nations in an effort to attain a universal consensus 
41  Amplius S. Takahashi, International Law and a Human Rights Approach to Drug Control, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing (forthcoming 2016); El régimen internacional de control de drogas: 
formación, evolución e interacción con las políticas nacionales. El caso de la política de drogas en 
España (PhD thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2015).
42  See J. Otis, above n. 4.
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on drug policies43. For its part, the FARC has agreed ‘to put to an end any 
relation that, in its efforts to promote the rebellion, it may have had with this 
phenomenon’ of drug trafficking44.
Finally, international cooperation on drugs issues has been more illusory 
than real, as appears in particular from the lack of a strategic approach to the issue 
of drug trafficking, including the seeking of commitments from other countries 
and guerrilla groups to rethink the present policy on narcotic drugs.
43  Ibid.
44  Ibid.

